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Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW

Narcotics Law

-

Possession of Hypodermic Syringe or Needle

Louisiana's narcotics law, with its heavy penalties to combat
the vicious evil that it regulates, has been the source of much
bitter litigation. In State v. Johnson' the Supreme Court held
that "guilty knowledge is an essential ingredient of the crime
of possession of narcotic drugs," despite the fact that the narcotics law simply denounced the possession of narcotics, and said
nothing about criminal intent or guilty knowledge. 2 Then in the
first Birdsell case, 3 in reversing the conviction of a defendant
who was in possession of a hypodermic syringe and needle, the
court read in a requirement that the defendant must possess the
articles with an intent to use them in violation of the narcotics
law. The court stated that "the defendant was entitled to prove
that his intent was anything but that of violating the law ....
[H] e was entitled to prove his good faith in possessing the prohibited articles."' 4 In recent BirdselU No. 25 the Louisiana Supreme Court, apparently ignoring its holding in Birdsell No. 1
that guilty intent is essential where the defendant is prosecuted
for the possession of a hypodermic syringe and needle, held that
the statute was unconstitutional insofar as it imposed liability
for possession of the prohibited articles. It was implicit in the
reasoning of Birdsel No. 2 that the statute was construed. as
punishing the mere possession of the syringe and needle, regardless of their intended use. Given this construction, the
statute was properly declared unconstitutional as punishing the
mere possession of an instrument, the hypodermic syringe and
needle, which has many normal proper and harmless uses. To
impose such liability is violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 317, 334, 82 So.2d 24, 30 (1955), 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 229
(1956).
2. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950).
3. 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957), 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 122.
4. 232 La. at 731, 95 So.2d at 292.
5. 104 So.2d 148 (La. 1958).
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The case was similar to the Nevada case of Park v. State,6 where
a statute which made possession of cattle hides with the ears
or brands removed unlawful, was held to constitute a taking of
property without due process. After pointing out that the removal of the ears and brands was incidental to the normal use
of the hides, the court concluded that "to prevent a few from
illegal practices the many are deprived of the use of property."
While Birdsell No. 2 finds logical support with the statute construed as punishing the possession of a hypodermic syringe and
needle for innocent and proper purposes, it is a bit difficult to
reconcile it with the holding in Birdsell No. 1 that the statute
did not apply to the innocent possessor of these articles.
Entrapment
State v. Emerson7 applied the generally accepted principle
that "it is socially desirable for criminals to be apprehended and
brought to justice and there is nothing whatever wrong or out
of place in setting traps to catch those bent on crime."" In that
case a conviction of unlawful sale of beer to minors, based upon
evidence procured through two minors under eighteen who
bought the liquor as decoys for the police officer, was affirmed.
In this case the officer, through the decoys, had merely afforded
the defendant an opportunity to carry on his illegal sales. A
different situation would have been presented if the officers had
entrapped a law-abiding seller, by presenting decoys who had
every appearance of being over the prescribed age of eighteen.
In such a situation the combination of the unconscious offender
plus the concealed disability of the decoy would operate to create
a sort of estoppel against convictionY Thus, if there had been a
.substantial basis for the defendant's claim that the decoys "had
:the appearance of being over eighteen," it would appear that a
case of illegal entrapment would have been made out.
Driving a Vehicle while Intoxicated
The crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated'0 was
6. 42 Nev. 386, 178 Pac. 389 (1919);
7. 233 La. 885, 98 So.2d 225 (1957).
8. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 921 (1957).
9. United States v. Healey, 202 Fed. 349 (1913) setting aside a conviction
for sale of liquor to an Indian, where the decoy (purchaser) had every appearance
of being a white man. Judge Bourquin stated ". . . the act is innocent but for
the status of the solicitor, and because he is a decoy of concealed disability the
act is blameless, and there is estoppel against conviction."
10. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950).
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limited by the Viator case" to situations where the driver's intoxicated condition had resulted from the drinking of distilled
beverages such as whiskey and gin. The phrase "intoxicating
liquor," reasoned the court, did not include fermented beverages
such as beer or wine. In 1956 the drunken driving article was
amended so as to substitute the broader words "alcoholic beverages" for the words "intoxicating liquor. ' 12 As thus amended
it covered the driver whose intoxicated condition had resulted
from beer or wine, as well as from whiskey and other liquors.
In State v. McAlister 13 the defendant had been charged, convicted, and sentenced as a fourth offender. The motion to quash
the charge of prior convictions was based on the claim that the
first three convictions had been under the drunken driving article before the 1956 amendment, and were for an entirely different offense. The trial judge sustained the motion to quash,
but his ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court. In so holding,
the Supreme Court flatly rejected the contention that the
amended article established a new crime. Justice Hawthorne
stated that it "denounces exactly the same crime as before its
amendment" in that "the essential elements of the crime are
unchanged by the amendment, these essential elements being
the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated." It is significant, although not mentioned in Justice Hawthorne's opinion,
that the change in the statute had enlarged the scope of the
crime, so that any prior convictions must necessarily have been
for conduct which would amount to operating a vehicle While
intoxicated under the present law. A stronger argument for not
counting the prior convictions would have been made if the 1956
amendment had restricted, rather than enlarged, the scope of the
crime.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Short Form Indictments
The short form indictment, authorized by Article 235 of the
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, 14 provides effective relief from
the confusing technicalities of the old common law indictment
rules. Specific abbreviated forms are provided for charging a
number of important and well understood crimes. These short
11. State v. Viator, 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956).
12. La. Act 122 of 1956.
13. 234 La. 1028, 102 So.2d 444 (1958).
14. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950); Accord, A.L.I. CODE OF CIM.. PROC. § 188
(1930).
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forms had been upheld for murder, 15 theft,16 aggravated rape, 17
and manslaughter.18 All of these crimes were offenses which
could be committed in several ways, but they had a well-understood meaning and scope. A 1944 amendment of Article 235 extended the short forms to all Criminal Code crimes, providing
that it would "be sufficient to charge the defendant by using
the name and article number of the offense committed."' 19 In the
case of State v. Straughan20 an indictment, drawn pursuant to
the 1944 amendment, charged the multifarious and purely statutory crime of gambling by name and article number. Reversing
its prior holding in State v. Davis,2' the Louisiana Supreme
Court held, by a six to three decision, that the short form gambling indictment was insufficient. Chief Justice Fournet's
scholarly opinion contained some statements which, if read alone
and out of context, might cast a shadow upon the validity of
all short form indictments. 22 However, the Straughan case was
dealing with a charge of gambling, a crime which may be committed in a multitude of different forms and which does not
have a well understood general meaning, and the charge was
filed by simply stating the name and article number of the
crime. Justice Fournet's opinion indicated a continued adherence
to the view that the specific short forms of Article 235 were
sufficient in charging crimes having a well-defined meaning and
scope, such as murder, theft, or rape. 23 Any doubts in this regard were dispelled by the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in
State v. Elias24 which upheld a conviction of attempted man25
slaughter under a short form indictment for attempted murder.
Justice Ponder, writing for a unanimous court, distinguished
the Straughan case where the charge was brought under the
1944 amendment. The Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held that this amendment carries the short form beyond
proper constitutional bounds. The Supreme Court's position as
15. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).
16. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
17. State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d 670 (1946).
18. State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950).
19. La. Act 233 of 1944; Accord, A.L.I. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 154(a).
20. 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956), 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 406
(1957).
21. 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945), 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 716 (1946).
22. "[A]ll of the essential facts necessary to describe the nature and cause of
the offense must be incorporated in the initial criminal charge." 229 La. 1036,
1072, 87 So.2d 523, 536.
23. 229 La. 1036, 1048, 87 So.2d 523, 527 (1956).
24. 234 La. 1, 99 So.2d 1 (1958).
25. An attempted manslaughter verdict is responsive to an attempted murder
charge under LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950).
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to how far the Legislature may go in authorizing short form
indictments is now rather clear. It will continue to sustain the
validity of specific short forms for well understood crimes, such
as murder or attempted murder; but has drawn the line upon
charging multifarious and purely statutory crimes, such as gambling or obscenity, by name and article number.
Where specific short forms are employed in charging well
understood crimes, care must be exercised to be sure that the
26
statutory form is fully complied with. In State v. Broussard
an information charged "simple burglary of Cagnina's Bar, in
the City of CroWley,... in violation of La. R.S. 14:62." While
the information purported to follow the short form, the Supreme
Court held that it would not support the verdict since it "failed
to describe or particularize the houseboat or other structure,
watercraft or movable as the case may be purportedly unlawfully entered, and to specify or designate to whom it belonged
as required by R.S. 15:235."27 However, in State v. Feltus,2 8 a
negligent homicide indictment, charging that the defendant
"being wilfully negligently killed Wilson Weatherton" was held
sufficient. While agreeing that the words "wilfully" and "negligently" are opposites and incompatible, the Supreme Court upheld the state's contention that the word "wilfully" as contained
in the instant indictment is to be treated as surplusage, the accused having been properly charged in the short form authorized
by La. R.S. 15:235 with having "negligently killed Wilson
Weatherton. ' '29 Justice Hamiter emphasized the provision of
La. R.S. 15:240 that "no indictment is invalid by reason of any
repugnant allegations contained therein, provided that an offense is charged. All unnecessary allegations shall be rejected as
surplusage."
Long Form Indictments
The requirement of Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that "the indictment must state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense" has been occasionally
interpreted so as virtually to require a spelling out of the de26. 233 La. 866, 98 So.2d 218 (1957).
27. 233 La. at 883, 98 So.2d at 224. The short form provided by LA. R.S.
15:235 is "Simple Burglary- A.B. committed simple burglary of the houseboat
(or other structure, watercraft, movable as the case may be) belonging to C.D."
28. 234 La. 822, 101 So.2d 682 (1958).
29. 234 La. at 823, 101 So.2d at 683.
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tails of the crime. For example, in State v. Kelly 0 an indictment for false registration by a voter was held insufficient for
failure to specify the nature of the false information which
formed the basis of the charge. Justice McCaleb's dissent
pointed out that the type of false registration had been stated,
and that details as to the specific information submitted were
obtainable through a bill of particulars. Fortunately, other decisions are more liberal than the Kelly case. In State v. Green81
the Supreme Court upheld an indictment for simple kidnapping
which tracked the Criminal Code article, despite defense counsel's contention that the indictment should have stated the place
from or to which the victim was transported, the means of
transportation and the type of force employed. Similarly, in a
group of five 1957-1958 decisions, the court upheld indictments
and informations which had been attacked by reason of their
failure to spell out the details of the crime charged. In State v.
Almerico8 2 the court upheld an information charging violation
of a statute8 which forbids liquor dealers to "(7) Employ or
permit females, commonly known as 'B Girls', to solicit patrons
for drinks and to accept drinks from patrons and receive therefor any commission or any remuneration in any other way."
The information tracked the language of the statute, except that
the phrase "B Girls" was omitted. In overruling defense counsel's contention that the information should have stated the
names of the persons allegedly employed to solicit the drinks and
the "time of day such acts occurred," Justice Ponder stated,
"What the defendant is seeking to do here is to force the State
' 34
to divulge evidence that it relies upon to prove the offense.
3
In State v. Emerson"
the affidavit upheld followed the language
of the statute and also set out the facts and circumstances of the
alleged offense of selling beer to minors under eighteen years
of age.30 Such a charge would be sufficient, even under the strict
requirements of the Kelly case. In State v. Kershaw 7 an indictment, specifically following the language of the issuing worthless checks article of the Criminal Code, 8s was upheld. Chief
30. 225 La. 495, 73 So.2d 437 (1954).
31. 231 La. 1058, 93 So.2d 657 (1957).
660, 76 So.2d 921 (1954).
32. 232 La. 847, 95 So.2d 334 (1957).
33. LA. R.S. 26:88(7) (1950).
34. 232 La. at 853, 95 So.2d at 336.
35. 233 La. 885, 98 So.2d 225 (1957).
36. LA. R.S. 26:285(1) (1950).
37. 234 La. 579, 100 So.2d 873 (1958).
38. LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950).

See also State v. Scheuering, 226 La.
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Justice Fournet stated that "this would unquestionably be sufficient to support a subsequent plea of acquittal or conviction." ' 9
In State v. Kaufman40 an information alleging sale of narcotic
drugs was not defective because of its failure to allege the ages
of the defendant and the purchaser. In State v. Clements41 the
information charged that the "accused sold intoxicating liquor
for beverage purposes in Sabine Parish, Louisiana, where the
sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited." There was a dispute as
to whether the prosecution was under the statutory provision
for local option, or under the local ordinance adopted pursuant
thereto. The Supreme Court held that the information was responsive to either the statute or the ordinance, in that it was
only necessary to charge the defendant with selling intoxicating
liquor for beverage purposes. Properly distinguishable from the
above cases are charges of multiple crimes, such as disturbing
48
and gambling, 44
the peace,42 indecent behavior with juveniles,
where the particular way in which the crime was committed
must be specified. Simply to charge such offenses in the language of the statute would not satisfy his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of the offense.
The Bill of Particulars
Where the short form indictment is used, reducing the details
provided by the formal charge, the trial judge should be liberal
in granting reasonable requests for particulars. 45 The defendant is entitled to know what the state intends to prove. Even
then, the right to a bill of particulars is not unlimited. It cannot be employed in a fishing expedition for a recital of the details of the state's evidence, nor used to harass the state by de47
46
In State v. Rowan and Mears
mands for non-essential details.
the defendants, charged with murder by a short-form indictment, filed a motion for a bill of particulars as to whether the
defendants were being prosecuted under clause (1) of the murder article 48 for intentional killing, or clause (2) for felony
39. 234 La. at 582, 100 So.2d at 874.
40. 234 La. 673, 101 So.2d 197 (1958).
41. 234 La. 631, 100 So.2d 892 (1958).
42. State v. Verdin, 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939).
43. State v. Hebert, 205 La. 110, 117 So.2d 3 (1944).
44. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945).
45. State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
46. Bresee, Information, Indictment and Arraignment, 1953 U. oF ILL. LAW
FoRUM 322, 329; Comment, The Bill of Particulars in Criminal Cases, 12 LouiSiANA LAW

REviEw 457 (1952).

47. 233 La. 284, 96 So.2d 569 (1957).
48. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950).
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murder; and if under clause (2) the felony which the defendants were allegedly perpetrating when the homicide occurred. In
reply the state informed the defendants that they were being
prosecuted under both clauses of the murder article, in that the
defendants had a specific intent to inflict great bodily harm
upon the victim (clause 1) and that the homicide occurred while
the offenders were engaged in the perpetration of both armed
and simple robbery (clause 2). In reversing the trial judge's
ruling that the state should elect, the Supreme Court followed
its prior decision in State v. Prince.49 In so holding, the court
pointed out that murder can be committed in violation of either
clause (1) or (2) of Article 30, or under both clauses at the
same time - which is exactly what was alleged to have happened
in the instant case. The bill of particulars could not be appropriately employed as a device to force the state to restrict its
proof to one of these methods of committing the crime. If additional authority were needed to support the Supreme Court's
holding in the Rowan and Mears and Prince cases, it can be
found by analogy to Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This article states that where alternative offenses are
disjunctively enumerated in a statute, they may be charged conjunctively in the same count. Where such a dual charge is
brought, proof of either phase of the charge will support a conviction. 50 In such a situation it should be equally appropriate to
charge the crime by a short form indictment and specify the dual
charges in the bill of particulars.
Time for Urging Duplicity
State v. Blankenship' held that it is too late to urge duplicity for the first time in a motion for a new trial. The objection of duplicity, under the express language of Article 221
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 52 "can not be urged after

the jury has been sworn, and must be set up either by demurrer
or by a motion to quash the indictment." Also, it is clearly a
formal defect and is thus subject to the general rule that such
53
defects, unless seasonably urged, are cured by the verdict.
49. 216 La. 989, 45 So.2d 366 (1950).
50. State v. Bryan, 175La. 442, 143 So. 362 (1932).
51. 231 La. 993, 93 So.2d 533 (1957).
52. LA. R.S. 15:221 (1950).
53. Id. 15:288; State v. Clement, 42 La. Ann. 583, 7 So. 685 (1890) ; State
v. Scott, 48 La. Ann. 293, 19 So. 141 (1896).
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Amendment of Indictment
Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
trial judge "at any time before, during or after the trial [to]
amend the indictment in respect to any defect, imperfection or
omission in form or substance or of any variance with the evi5
the original information
dence. '54 In State v. Blankenship"
stated, "That Earl Blankenship... on the .... day of the month
of February, 1955 . . committed theft of barbed wire, the prop-

erty of Ed Holley, of a value of $50.00." When the case came up
for trial, but prior to the calling of the jury, the state amended
the information "to show [as is disclosed by the court minutes]
that [the] theft took place on or about January 29, 1955, and
February 6, 1955, and also to show ownership of the wire to be
[in] J. R. Dillard, instead of in Ed Holley." 56 Defense counsel's
objection to the amendment, on the ground that he was prepared to defend only as to the date and ownership alleged in the
original information, was overruled and the amendment permitted. The date of the alleged crime is not an essential averment of the indictment, 57 and an amendment of the date will
not ordinarily be treated as material. 8 If the accused is surprised and prejudiced in his defense, as where he was intending
to rely on an alibi, he is entitled to a continuance for a reasonable time so that he may prepare to account for his whereabouts
on the newly alleged date. 59 In the instant case the court found
that the defense had not made a proper showing of prejudice
resulting from the changed date of the crime. The defendant
had requested no bill of particulars, although the original information had not stated the date of the crime. Also, he had
failed to request a continuance after the information was
amended. The change in the name of the owner of the allegedly
stolen property was not shown to have been prejudicial. The
name of the owner of property is "unimportant" in crimes
against property such as theft, "the state being required to show
only that it belonged to someone other than the accused." 60
54. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
55. 231 La. 993, 93 So.2d 533 (1957).
56. 231 La. at 997, 93 So. at 535.
57. LA. R.S. 15:230 (1950).
58. State v. Walters, 16 La. Ann. 400 (1862) ; State v. Fontenette, 38 La.
Ann. 61 (1886).
59. State v. Singleton, 169 La. 191, 124 So. 824 (1929).
60. 231 La. at 998, 93 So.2d at 535, citing State v. Babineaux, 146 La. 290,
83 So. 558 and State v. Mills, 214 La. 979, 39 So.2d 439.
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Selection of Tales Jurors
Article 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "it
shall be the duty of the jury commission at such times as the
court may order, to select one hundred tales jurors," and place
their names in a tales jury box, from which the clerk is to draw
supplemental jurors in cases where "the regular venire is exhausted, or it appears that it will be exhausted before the selection of a jury." In State v. Smith6 ' the defendant, in appealing
from a murder conviction, alleged irregularities in the drawing
of the tales jurors, as follows: (1) In having slips of paper with
names lying loose in the tales jury box instead of a sealed
envelope, (2) in having the sheriff, instead of the clerk, draw
names of the talesmen, and (3) that three of the names on the
tales jury list were inaccurate. In affirming the conviction the
Supreme Court pointed out that Article 186 does not require that
the slips with names be in a sealed envelope, as do the provisions of Articles 182 and 184 governing the regular jury and
grand jury lists. While Article 186 specifically provides that
the clerk shall draw the names of tales jurors and should be
followed, the court held that the deviation was not reversible
error. Justice Hamiter stated, "Defense counsel concede that
there was no fraud or prejudice flowing from the court's action, and they do not contend that any result would have been
changed by having the clerk draw the names. On numerous occasions we have held that mere error of the judge during the
course of a trial will not be sufficient cause for setting aside the
verdict and sentence; that to warrant such action the error must
have resulted in prejudice or a denial of a substantial right to
the accused. For example in State v. Cullens,62 we observed:
'... appeals in criminal cases are not granted merely to test the
correctness of the trial judge's ruling, but only to rectify any
injury caused thereby'."6 In a similar spirit of practical liberality, the court held that, since the inaccuracies in the names
were slight and the persons intended were "readily identifiable,"
that admittedly "pro forma" objection was not a ground for
reversal.
The Supreme Court's holding that the drawing of the tales
jury names by the sheriff, rather than by the judge as directed
by Article 186, was not reversible error, stands in pleasing con61. 234 La. 19, 99 So.2d 8 (1958).
62. 168 La. 976, 123 So. 645, 648 (1929).
63. 234 La. at 25, 99 So.2d at 10.
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trast to the court's technical ruling in State v. Kifer0 4 that the
drawing of the names of the grand jurors out of a cigar box,
rather than from an envelope as directed by Article 184, constituted reversible error. Possibly the Kifer decision is justified
by the legislative history of the requirement that the grand
jurors' names be drawn from an envelope. The repeated amendments of Article 184 had shown a legislative intent to require
strict adherence to a method of drawing that was designed best
to insure a selection by chance. No such legislative history characterizes the requirement of Article 186 that the tales jurors be
drawn by the clerk. Past judicial history has shown a consistently liberal construction of this article. The earliest enactment of what subsequently became Article 186 made but fleeting
reference to the tales jury, and no procedure for selecting it was
given.6 1 From this the law grew slowly into its present form.
Two early cases set the pattern of liberal construction, holding
that it was not necessary to follow formalities0 6 and that the
sheriff could read the names of the talesmen off a list of qualified voters.6 7 When the provision for drawing names from the
jury box was added in 1877,8 the trial judge was left with great
discretion. The cases show that it was not considered necessary
that the box be used where the list was exhausted in any event,69
or where the accused did not insist upon use of the box, 70 or

where the names were drawn from the general venire box instead of the tales jury box. 71 Later cases held that defendant's

counsel had no right to watch the drawing,72 that it was not
irregular to let the sheriff call the talesmen from a list which
had been made at the drawing, 73 that it was not prejudicial to
draw the actual number of needed tales jurors from a group of
talesmen which had been previously drawn as an estimate;74
and in 1950 the Dowdy case75 reaffirmed that it was not an
64. 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937).
65. La. Acts 1855, No. 243, § 3.
66. State v. Smith, 26 La. Ann. 62 (1874). But note that this was prior to
La. Acts 1877, No. 44, §7.
67. State v. Kennedy, 11 La. Ann. 479 (1856).
68. La. Acts 1877, No. 44, § 7.
69. State v. Dorsey, 40 La. Ann. 739, 5 So. 26 (1888).
70. State v. Jones, 52 La. Ann. 211, 26 So. 782 (1899).
71. State v. Bagwell, 154 La. 980, 98 So. 549 (1923).
72. State v. Sisemore, 151 La. 675, 92 So. 274 (1922).
73. State v. Ashworth, 139 La. 590, 71 So. 860 (1916).
74. State v. Burris, 204 La. 608, 16 So.2d 124 (1943).
75. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496, certiorari denied, 340 U.S.
856 (1950).
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abuse of discretion for the sheriff to draw tales jurors from
names which had previously been drawn from the tales jury box.
Change of Venue
76 follows the
State v. Faciane
well-settled rule that an application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be reversed by the
Supreme Court except upon the affirmative showing of a clear
abuse of that discretion. This rule is based on the fact that the
trial judge has a better opportunity to evaluate the evidence,
supporting the claim of wide-spread hostility and bias, than does
the appellate tribunal which is viewing a cold record. 77 In the
Faciane case the defense had apparently fallen considerably
short of meeting its burden of proving 78 that the citizenry of
the community where the indictment was laid were so aroused
against the accused that they could not have a fair and impartial
trial in that parish. Five witnesses, called by the defense from
various parts of the parish in an attempt to prove local prejudice,
had all stated that the defendants could obtain a fair and impartial trial. Actually, it is quite difficult to establish a basis
for change of venue by witnesses simply stating their opinion
that a fair trial cannot be had in the parish. Mob violence and
mass demonstrations, closely associated with the time of the
trial, would be the strongest evidence of such local prejudice as
would preclude a fair trial. 79 The Supreme Court also reaffirmed
its previous rulings that inflammatory newspaper articles are
not, by themselves, particularly strong evidence of such local
hostility and prejudice as will justify a change of venue.80 It is
inherent in the newspapers' desire for a "good story" that those
accounts stress the more sensational guilt side of the case.
Motion for Severance
Under Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "Persons jointly indicted shall be jointly tried, unless the district
attorney elect to place such persons separately upon trial, or
unless the court, upon motion of defendant, shall, after a hearing
contradictorily with the district attorney, order a severance."
76. 233 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1957).
77. State v. Powell, 109 La. 727, 33 So. 748 (1903) ; State v. Roberson, 159
La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925) ; State v. Collier, 161 La. 856, 109 So. 516 (1926).
78. State v. Powell, 109 La. 727, 33 So. 748 (1903) ; State v. Swails, 226 La.
441, 76 So.2d 523 (1954) ; State v. Rini, 153 La. 57, 95 So. 400 (1922).
79. State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925).
80. Ibid.; State v. Rini, 153 La. 57, 95 So. 400 (1922).
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The ordering of a severance, upon motion of the defendant,
rests in the discretion of the trial judge,8 whose ruling will not
be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse
of discretion resulting in prejudice.8 2 Generally, a severance will
be ordered where one of the defendants has made a statement
inculpating a co-defendant and the state intends to introduce
the statement in evidence. 83 In State v. Faciane4 three defendants were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted of murder. Defendant McMiller had moved for a severance on the ground that
a statement of co-defendant Faciane incriminated him and the
state intended to use the statement in evidence. The trial judge
refused to order a severance. In upholding the conviction the
Supreme Court held that the antagonistic and incriminating
statement of Faciane could not serve as the basis of reversal
since it was never introduced in evidence and the defendant was
not prejudiced thereby. This ruling is in accord with the Supreme Court's prior decisions in State v. Livsey"5 and State v.
Duplechain.86 If it had been shown that defendant Faciane had,
by antagonistic statements at the trial, prejudiced defendant
McMiller's case, a proper ground for reversal would have been
made out.
Continuance
Two 1957 Supreme Court cases illustrate the fundamental
principle, set out in Article 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the trial judge is given a "sound discretion" in
granting or refusing a continuance, reviewable only where there
has been an "arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such discretion."8 In State v. Jones 8 the court's refusal to grant a continuance for the location of defense counsel's sole witness was
upheld - there being no showing that the ruling was arbitrarily
unreasonable. The application for a continuance was not in
writing 9 and had failed to meet the requirements of Article
81. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954)
State v. Gresham, 132
La. 594, 61 So. 681 (1913).
82. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954).
83. State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So.2d 898 (1949); State v. Desroche, 47
La. Ann. 651, 17 So. 209 (1895).
84. 233 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1957).
85. 190 La. 474, 182 So. 576 (1938).
86. 136 La. 389, 67 So. 175 (1915).
87. LA. R.S. 15:320 (1950).
88. 233 La. 775, 98 So.2d 185 (1957).
89. LA. R.S. 15:321 (1950).
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32290 as to the contents of a motion for a continuance based upon
the absence of a witness. Conversely, in State v. Blankenship9'
a continuance was granted upon motion of the district attorney
on the ground that a material witness for the state had absented
himself from the state and could not be located. Defense counsel's objection that the state had failed to exercise due diligence
in issuing a subpoena for the witness was overruled. In holding
that the granting of the continuance did not constitute an abuse
of the trial judge's discretion so as to deprive defendant of his
right to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact
that the issue of a subpoena would have been vain and useless
since the witness' whereabouts were at that time unknown. As
a make-weight, the court pointed out that the accused had not
been prejudiced by the ruling since he was out of jail on reasonable bond pending trial. It is only in extreme cases where the
trial judge's ruling will be overruled. It has been held reversible
error to refuse a continuance in order to allow defense counsel
in a homicide case adequate time to prepare the case. 92 Also,
the court must be liberal in granting a continuance in cases
where defense counsel's alibi defense has been nullified by a
change in the date of the alleged crime. 93
Insanity Defense -

Lunacy Commission

The appointment of a lunacy commission to examine the defendant, either as to present insanity or as to insanity at the
time of the crime, rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.
In State v. Palmere4 a defendant, who had killed his wife in a
drunken rage, was charged with murder. In applying for a
lunacy commission the defendant claimed that he did not remember the killing. In support of his denial of the application,
the trial judge pointed out that it presented no facts to support
the appointment of a commission. It merely alleged that defendant was an alcoholic and suffered from "alcoholic amnesia,"
and the only evidence on this was defendant's own testimony
that he had once consulted an army psychiatrist who told him
that he "might be an alcoholic" and defendant's assertion that
sometimes when he got drunk he could not later recall his ac90. LA. R.S. 15:322 (1950).
91. 231 La. 993, 93 So.2d 533 (1957).
92. State v. Wilson, 181 La. 61, 158 So. 621 (1935)
La. 970, 103 So. 283 (1925).
93. State v. Barnhart, 143 La. 596, 78 So. 975 (1918)
La. 191, 124 So. 824 (1929).
94. 232 La. 468, 94 So.2d 439 (1957).

State v. Roberson, 157
State v. Singleton, 169
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tions. There was nothing in the record to indicate insanity, nor
did defendant's actions or behavior indicate insanity. In affirming the trial judge's exercise of discretion in refusing to appoint
a commission, the Supreme Court followed its well-settled policy
of not disturbing the trial court's ruling except for a clear abuse
of discretion. 95
More complicated problems were presented in State v. Bai97
ley 96 and State v. Faciane,
but in both of these cases the Supreme Court adhered to its sound general policy of supporting
the trial judge's rulings and procedures whenever possible. In
Bailey the trial judge had appointed a lunacy commission to determine the present mental condition of the defendant, i.e.,
whether he was "insane or mentally defective to the extent that
[he was] unable to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his defense." 98 The commission was composed of three
doctors, one being a psychiatrist, which met with the accused and
on the same day reported to the trial judge its opinion that the
defendant was not capable of assisting in his defense and recommended that he be sent to the East Louisiana State Hospital for
observation and testing. The trial judge acted on this recommendation and later received a report from the hospital that the
defendant was suffering from severe mental illness which should
have further treatment. The District Attorney upon becoming
aware of the latter report sent a copy of the defendant's detailed
confession to each member of the commission, feeling that it evidenced a greater mental capacity on the part of the accused
than he displayed to the doctors; then moved for a hearing. At
the hearing the Commission reversed itself based on the contents
of the confession and a misconception of present insanity as used
in Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; two of the
members testifying that they did not re-examine the defendant
subsequent to their receipt of his detailed confession from the
district attorney. Counsel for the defense then moved that the
commission be discharged and a new one be appointed. The trial
judge overruled the motion. Counsel for defense had substantial
grounds for demanding that a new commission be appointed, due
to the vacillation of the first commission and the somewhat irregular procedures it had followed. Yet the Supreme Court up95. State v. Johnson, 226 La. 30, 74 So.2d 402 (1954) ; State v. Bentley, 219
La. 893, 54 So.2d 137 (1951) ; State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940).
96. 233 La. 40, 96 So.2d 34 (1957).
97. 233 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1957).
98. LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
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held the trial court's rulings, both in refusing to appoint a new
commission and in ruling adversely to the defendant on the issue
of present insanity.
The flexibility of the procedures that may be followed by the
lunacy commission is further illustrated by Faciane, where a
three-man lunacy commission had been appointed for the apparent dual purpose of inquiring into the present mental condition
of the accused, and also his mental condition at the time of the
crime. This procedure, while certainly a practical one, is not
authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Articles 267 and
268 appear to contemplate separate investigations as to present
mental capacity and mental capacity at the time of the crime.
The scope of the commission's investigation was not raised and
is not discussed in Faciane. However, the procedures followed by
the commission were challenged. The commission had submitted
a report to the trial judge in which they stated that in their
opinion the accused was normal mentally, but in an abundance
of precaution and to remove all doubt, recommended that he be
sent to the Louisiana State Hospital for the mentally ill for observation. Subsequently, one member of the commission, as clinical director, and another staff psychiatrist of the hospital, addressed a letter to the trial judge in which they stated they found
the accused sane after close observation. The trial judge called
a hearing, at which time the defendant objected to the admission
of the latter report on the grounds that it was not that of the
commission and that the commission had not kept the accused
under observation or filed a report as required by Article 269
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial judge overruled the
objections of the defendant, concluded that the defendant was
presently sane, and set the case for trial. The Supreme Court
upheld the trial judge, finding that he was correct in holding
that the initial report of the commission was the report and that
the recommendation for further observation would not detract
from the fact that it was the report required by Article 269 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court also upheld the trial
judge as to the admissibility of the second report, declaring the
trial judge the exclusive judge of the sufficiency and credibility
of the evidence introduced to establish mental capacity under
such a plea. The court further found that nothing in Article 269
required that the accused be kept under constant observation or
directed the commission as to how it should conduct its examinations. Faciane is particularly significant in expressing judicial
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recognition of flexibility of procedures in the lunacy commission's investigation and report, and of the wide discretion of the
trial judge in weighing and evaluating the evidence when making his finding as to present mental capacity. Here is an area
where, in view of the ambiguity of the statute law and the nebulous nature of the issues to be determined, an ultra-technical attitude of the Supreme Court would be most unfortunate.
Racial Discriminationin Jury Selection
99
the United States Supreme Court held
In State v. Pierre
that systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries and jury venire
constituted a denial of due process and equal protection of the
law. The task of jury commissions which sought to comply with
this mandate was complicated by the declaration in Cassel v.
Texas'0 0 that it was a violation of the equal protection requirement to "consciously take color into account" in selecting juries
and jury lists. Literal compliance with this prohibition is almost
impossible, but it has been logically construed as a prohibition
against the inclusion of a token number of Negroes' names in an
effort to circumvent the Pierre ruling. 10 1 Subsequent decisions
of our Louisiana Supreme Court have sought to clarify this matter and to bring the guiding principles into clearer focus. It is
understandable that the Negro names on the jury will not constitute a strict mathematical percentage of the number of Negroes in the population. Percentages and proportions must necessarily be considered in the light of the economic, moral, educational, and other conditions prevailing among the Negro race,
and the jury lists may contain a relatively small number of
Negro names even where the jury commission has made a conscientious effort to secure full Negro representation on the jury
lists. 0 2 The recent cases of State v. Palmer'03 and State v. Eubanks0 4 conformed to the pattern of the prior jurisprudence. In
Palmer a Negro defendant urged discrimination in appealing
from a murder conviction. He contended that Negroes had been
systematically excluded from grand juries in Orleans Parish,
and that the two Negroes, who served on the grand jury which

99. 306 U.S. 345 (1939).
100. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
101. State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208 (1952).
102. State v. Pierre, 198 La. 619, 3 So.2d 895 (1941) ; State v. Dorsey, 207
La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
103. 232 La. 468, 94 So.2d 439 (1957).
104. 232 La. 289, 94 So.2d 262 (1957).
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indicted him, were placed there as a mere token inclusion. These
contentions, according to the Louisiana Supreme Court, were not
borne out by the record. There had been ten Negro names on
the grand jury list of one hundred names submitted to the trial
judge, and the inclusion of two Negroes on the grand jury of
twelve was hardly a mere "token" representation. The Supreme
Court also stressed the efforts of the trial judge to give qualified
Negro veniremen careful and full consideration. The court
quickly disposed of the novel contention, that the two Negro
members of the grand jury were only "persons of color" and not
actually Negroes, by the remark that it was "completely unrealistic" to attempt to further divide the colored race into classes.
In Eubanks the seventy-five names comprising the grand jury
panel contained the names of only six Negroes and no Negroes
were on the grand jury which indicted the Negro defendant for
murder of a white woman. The Louisiana Supreme Court examined the entire record and method of selection and concluded that
the jury commissioners had sought to include the names of many
Negroes, without proportionately limiting their numbers. The
court looked to the testimony of the district judge who selected
the grand jury and found no discrimination in his methods. He
testified that he had no knowledge of the race of a person prior
to selection and that he selected persons whom he considered to
be best qualified. The United States Supreme Court, however,
unanimously reversed the conviction. 1 5 It found that Orleans
Parish grand juries, the members of which are selected rather
than drawn by lot from the grand jury lists, had been selected
in such a manner as to exclude Negroes systematically from
grand jury service. Mr. Justice Black recapitulates the basis of
the Supreme Court's holding as follows: "Although Negroes comprise about one-third of the population of the parish, the uncontradicted testimony of various witnesses established that only
one Negro had been picked for grand jury duty within memory.
And this lone exception apparently resulted from the mistaken
impression that the juror was white. From 1936, when the Commission first began to include Negroes in the pool of potential
jurors, until 1954, when petitioner was indicted, 36 grand juries
were selected in the parish. Six or more Negroes were included
in each list submitted to the local judges. Yet out of the 432
jurors selected only the single Negro was chosen. Undisputed
testimony also proved that a substantial number of the large
105. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 78 S.Ct. 681, 2 L.Ed. 2d 991 (1958).
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Negro population in the parish were educated, registered to vote
and possessed the qualifications required for jury service, all of
which is emphasized by the fact that since 1936 the Commission
has regularly selected Negroes for the grand jury panel. Indeed,
Negroes have served on the federal grand jury in the parish for
many years."
In rejecting the district judge's testimony that the grand
jury had been selected without any thought of racial discrimination, Justice Black declared, "But as Chief Justice Hughes said
for the Court in Norris v. Alabama [citation omitted], 'If, in
the presence of such testimony as defendant adduced, the mere
general assertions by officials of their performance of duty were
to be accepted as an adequate justification for the complete exclusion of Negroes from jury service, the [Equal Protection
Clause]adopted with special reference to their protection would be but a vain and illusory requirement.' [cited cases
omitted] This is particularly true here where several of the parish judges apparently have never even interviewed a Negro in
selecting grand jurors. We are reluctantly forced to conclude
that the uniform and long-continued exclusion of Negroes from
grand juries shown by this record cannot be attributed to chance,
to accident, or to the fact that no sufficiently qualified Negroes
have ever been included in the lists submitted to the various local
judges."
The United States Supreme Court, in Eubanks, has drawn
the line as to proper methods of jury selection a little more clearly. There is nothing in the decision which should disturb the
Louisiana Supreme Court's rulings that Negro representation in
strict mathematical proportion to the Negro population is not
required. At the same time the inclusion of occasional token representation will not suffice.
Voir Dire Examination of Jurors
Hypothetical questions, aimed at committing prospective
jurors in advance as to how they will decide upon a stipulated
set of facts, are not favored.'" In two recent murder cases,
prospective jurors had been confused on voir dire by this type of
improper hypothetical questions; but in each the juror's qualification was apparent from the over-all voir dire examination and
106. State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941) ; State v. Smith, 216 La.
1041, 45 So.2d 617 (1950).
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the challenge for cause was properly denied. 10 7 As is pointed out
in Marr's Criminal Jurisprudenceof Louisiana, "though a juror
may on his voir dire examination by counsel have become confused and have made contradictory answers as to his qualifications or may seem to be disqualified, yet, if on examination by
the judge, the juror gives sufficient answers, he is a good
juror." 08
Opening Statement of District Attorney
Under Article 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the
duty of the district attorney to make an opening statement "explaining the nature of the charge against the accused and the
evidence by which he expects to establish the same."' 0 9 Evidence
not mentioned in the opening statement is inadmissible." 0 While
this general rule is liberally applied by the Louisiana Supreme
Court,"' it behooves the state to make mention of those elements
of proof which may be relied upon at the trial. This explains the
propriety of the district attorney's opening statements in two
1957 cases. In State v. Goins,"12 a murder case, the district attorney's opening statement referred to the stealing of an automobile used in the murder, to the attempted robbery of a person
other than the victim, and to the flight of the defendant from a
police officer on the night of the homicide. The Supreme Court
held that the reference to these other acts in the opening statement was proper, on the ground that they were admissible to
show preparation, intent, motive and consciousness of guilt.
Under Article 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where
knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, "evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the
commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty
knowledge and intent." For this evidence to be available at the
trial it should be mentioned in the opening statement. In State
v. Jones,"13 an armed robbery case, the district attorney's opening statement referred to the fact that he intended to introduce
some photographs of the scene of the crime and of the knife allegedly used by the defendant. The Supreme Court held that the
107. State v. Brazile, 234 La. 145, 99 So.2d 62 (1958) ; State v. Faciane, 233
La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1958).
108. 1 MARR, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 691 (2d ed. 1923).
109. State v. Barton, 207 La. 820, 22 So.2d 183 (1945) ; State v. Jones, 230
La. 356, 88 So.2d 655 (1956).
110. State v. Silsby, 176 La. 727, 146 So. 684 (1933).
111. State v. Paternostro, 225 La. 369, 73 So.2d 177 (1954).
112. 232 La. 238, 94 So.2d 244 (1957).
113. 233 La. 775, 98 So.2d 185 (1957).
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failure to introduce the photographs was not reversible error.
The opening statement is made prior to the introduction of evidence and forms no part thereof. It is designed to provide a general acquaintance with the case -to
enable the jury to understand and appreciate the testimony as the case unfolds at the
trial. When it appeared that the photographs might be needed
as proof at the trial, they must be mentioned in order to insure
their admissibility. When other evidence adduced at the trial appeared sufficient without them, the district attorney was free to
refrain from their introduction. He may terminate his presentation of evidence whenever he is satisfied that he has proved guilt
14
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Improper Remarks of District Attorney -

Waiver of Objections

Objections to improper remarks of the district attorney must
be promptly made or they are waived. This requirement of
prompt objection affords the trial judge an opportunity to counteract the effect of the remark by an immediate instruction to
the jury to disregard it; or if it is of so serious a nature as to be
incurable, the judge may declare a mistrial. In State v. Blankenship, 15 a theft case, the district attorney had referred to the
defendant in his opening statement as "an overbearing person
and possessing a dictatorial nature." Defense counsel's objection, which was not urged until the district attorney had completed his statement, came too late. While the statement was not
of a very serious nature, the trial judge might have admonished
the jury to disregard it if an objection had been promptly urged.
In State v. Neal,"6 the prejudicial remarks were of a more serious nature. In his closing argument to the jury, in a case where
a Negro woman was charged with attempted murder and convicted of attempted manslaughter, the district attorney made a
statement to the effect that he and the sheriff were not going to
stand for any Mississippi Negroes coming into Louisiana and terrorizing the community in juke joints. The remark was such as
to constitute an improper "appeal to prejudice," within the express prohibition of Article 381 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. If an objection had been promptly made, the
trial judge would probably have been required to declare a mistrial, since a remark showing substantial racial prejudice is not
114.
La. 630,
115.
116.,

State v. Wiebelt, 166 La. 836, 118 So. 38 (1928) ; State v. McKee, 170
128 So. 658 (1930).
231 La. 993, 93 So.2d 533 (1957).
231 La. 1048, 93 So.2d 554 (1957).
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the sort of improper remark that can be cured by an instruction
to disregard. Regardless of whether the remark was curable or
incurable, the objection came too late when made after convic7
tion in a motion for a new trial.1

List of Witnesses as Restriction on Proof
In State v. Bailey"8 the Supreme Court upheld the trial
judge's denial of a motion for a mistrial when the state called the
clerk of court to testify relative to the voluntariness of appellant's confession. The motion was predicated upon the fact that
the clerk's name did not appear on a list of state witnesses furnished defendant, nor was he named when the witnesses were
sequestered at the beginning of the trial. In holding that there
was no legal basis for the motion, Justice McCaleb, speaking for
the court, declared, "we know of no law which requires the listing of witnesses who are available to the State without subpoena." Prior to Bailey the rule was consistently adhered to that
there was no law that required the state to furnish the accused
with a list of its witnesses." 9 The first case to so hold was State
v. Kane,120 where the court declared "in the states that have no
statute of their own in the matter, their practice is regulated by
the Statute of Anne, as ours would be by virtue of the Act of
1805, directing that criminal proceedings shall be governed by
the practice in the common law courts unless otherwise provided.
But we have otherwise provided; that is, accused is provided
with a copy of the indictment and the list of the jury, but there
is no provision for his receiving a list of the state's witnesses."
In order to apprise the defendant of the evidence that will
probably confront him at the trial, Section 194 of the American
Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
names of the witnesses examined by the grand jury shall be endorsed on the indictment. It also stipulates that court rules may
provide for the furnishing of names of such other witnesses as
the state proposes to call. Ample safeguards are provided, so
that the failure to endorse witnesses' names will not invalidate
an otherwise sufficient indictment. The strongest objection to
the A.L.I. requirement is the fact that the defendant is not under
117. LA. R.S. 15:502 and 510 (1950).
118. 233 La. 40, 96 So.2d 34 (1957). Accord, State v. Goins, 232 La. 238, 94
So.2d 244 (1957).
119. State v. Blackman, 39 La. Ann. 847, 2 So. 588 (1887) ;State v. Daspit,
129 La. 732, 56 So. 661 (1911).
120. 36 La. Ann. 153 (1884).

1959]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

a reciprocal duty to acquaint the state of its witnesses - the
proffered information being a one-way proposition. It has also
been suggested that there is possibility of intimidation of witnesses, and that where this danger does not exist the average district attorney voluntarily furnishes such information. In favor
of the A.L.I. rule, it may be contended that the defendant is not
fully informed of the nature of the case against him, if the state's
witnesses and proof are kept a deep, dark secret. The general
common law rule, in the absence of any controlling statute, appears to be that the accused is not entitled as a matter of right
to a list of the state's witnesses; but that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to order that the accused be furnished
with a list of the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury
and of other witnesses whom the prosecution expects to call at
12 1
the trial.
Instructions to the Jury
Instructions by the court to the jury are a historic and fundamental feature of the jury trial. Orfield states: "Theoretically,
at least, the function of instructions is to enlighten the jury on
the law. The substantive rules of criminal law governing the
particular case are brought to the attention of the jury. Instructions are also a method by which appellate courts control juries
and trial courts. While the appellate court cannot review the
findings of fact of the jury, it can pass upon whether they might
have been misled by an error in the statement of law or whether
they might have found differently if requested instructions had
been given.'1 22 In State v. Eubanks123 the trial judge's refusal
of requested special charges was fully justified by the jurisprudence and the express provisions of Article 530 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure. 24 Space does not permit a detailed
specification of the requested charges. Suffice it to point out
that some charges relating to the state's burden of proving the
crime beyond "a reasonable doubt" were properly refused because they were already covered in the judge's written general
instructions. Other special charges relating to circumstantial
evidence were properly rejected in view of the fact that a review
121. 23 C.J.S. 949.
122. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 449 (1947).
123. 232 La. 289, 94 So.2d 262 (1957).
124. LA. R.S. 15:390 (1950) provides "the judge must give every such requested charge that is wholly correct and wholly pertinent, unless the matter contained
in such charge have already been given or unless such charge require 4ualification,
limitation, or explanation."
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of the testimony attached to the bills of exception and the written confession showed that the state was depending upon direct
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. Thus, the requested instruction was not pertinent to the case.
A more difficult problem was presented in State v. Cavanah125 where the trial judge had ignored defense counsel's request that he charge the jury wholly in writing. After giving his
written charge, the judge orally stated that the jury should not
acquit a man merely because of severity of the penalty that
might be imposed. 126 This, defense counsel claimed, was a violation of the provision of Article 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the judge's instruction shall be delivered in writing
whenever reasonably requested by either the prosecution or the
defense. It was urged that Article 389 is not complied with
unless the entire charge was in writing. While not denying that
the entire charge must, when requested, be in writing, the state
claimed that the court's oral remarks could not be properly
characterized as a part of the charge or as a special charge. On
a rehearing of the case, the Supreme Court held, with two
Justices dissenting, that the judge's "charge" to the jury included all matters included in his final address to the jury concerning the rules that they are to follow and apply in deciding
the case. In holding that error will be presumed where the defendant's right to demand a written charge is violated, the court
reiterated its statement in an earlier case that "written charges
are often better considered, more clearly expressed, and, in complicated cases at least, less likely to contain error. An oral charge,
although when the judge is delivering it, he knows it is being
taken by a stenographer, is not so likely to secure these advantages.''1 27
Timeliness of Appeal
Article 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that the
motion for an appeal must be made "within ten judicial days
after the rendition of the judgment complained of ;" -

recog-

nizing the fact that a dilatory judge, who fails to sign the bills
of exception promptly presented to him, may delay the filing of
the motion beyond the ten-day period. The article further states
125. 233 La. 565, 97 So.2d 396 (1957).
126. The crime charged, crime against nature, carried a possible maximum

penalty of a fine of $2,000 and 5 years imprisonment. LA. R.S. 14:89 (1950).
127. State v. Rini, 151 La. 179, 91 So. 664, 669 (1922).
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that in this situation, "the accused shall be granted an additional
delay to appeal of one day for every day after the tenth day the
judge fails to act finally upon the bills of exception tendered him
1 2S
the trial judge had defor signature." In State v. Broussard
layed ninety-three days in signing the bills of exceptions which
formed the basis of an appeal from a simple burglary conviction.
Defense counsel's motion for appeal was filed fifty-two days
after the signing of the bills of exception. Defense counsel contended that under Article 542 he was entitled to a delay of one
day for every day that elapsed from the tender of the bills until
they were signed, i.e., a period of ninety-three days commencing
with the date of signing. The Supreme Court, however, construed Article 542 to mean that the defendant was required to
file his motion for appeal on the next judicial day following the
signing of the bills of exception. On rehearing, the court reiterated its original holding that the defendant was not granted an
additional day for each day of delay by the judge. However, it
changed its prior holding as to when the obligation for filing
within one day should arise. The motion for appeal was to be
filed within one judicial day after the defendant had notice of
the judge's signing of the bills of exceptions, rather than from
the date of the signing; otherwise it would be impossible to comply with the statute since the defendant could not be expected
to check daily to determine whether the procrastinating judge
had finally signed the bills.1 2

9

Since the defendant had not been

given any official notice of the signing of the bills of exception,
the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal was timely. It
must be admitted that Broussard adopts a rather unusual construction of the language of the delay proviso in Article 542, but
the result appears a fair and practical one.
Lack of Jurisdiction- Raised by Writ of Certiorari
Lack of jurisdiction is a fundamental defect in the proceedings that can be raised at any time and in any manner. In State
v. :Laborde'30 the defendant had been tried and convicted in the
criminal district court of the crime of indecent behavior with
juveniles.13 1 The sentence imposed of a fine of $200 and four
128. 223 La. 866, 98 So.2d 218 (1957).
129. Justice Fournet states ". . . it is elementary that it would be impossible
for an accused to move for an appeal during the additional delay of one day
granted him unless he first received notice that the judge had acted on the bills."
233 La. at 880, 98 So.2d at 223.
130. 233 La. 556, 97 So.2d 393 (1957).
131. LA. R.S. 14:81 (1950).
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months imprisonment was not sufficient to give the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction. 3 2 Also, the defendant had not questioned the court's jurisdiction when tried by the criminal district court. However, the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari, and found the trial court to be without jurisdiction to
try an adult for a misdemeanor affecting a juvenile. 138 The writ
of certiorari, issued by the Supreme Court under its plenary
supervisory jurisdiction, may be employed as a means of challenging the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the trial court, even
where the issue has not been passed upon by the trial judge and
34
where the normal remedy of appeal does not exist.

132. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
133. Id. art. VII, § 52.
134. LA. R.S. 15:558 (1950).

